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Abstract
Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s initial decision to acquire nuclear weapons systems for the
Canadian Forces was followed by much debate within Cabinet. During the Cuban Missile
crisis, Cabinet Ministers continued to argue about whether Canada should fulfill its defence
commitments. Finally the Prime Minister and his Minister of External Affairs Howard Green
publicly opposed the nuclear commitments the government had originally undertaken.
This paper asserts that the underlying belief systems of influential decision-makers significantly
influenced defence decision-making leading to the Diefenbaker government’s contrasting
record of nuclear commitments. The research is based largely on documents arising out of the
recently-declassified records of Cabinet; the newly-opened personal papers of the Prime
Minister; and the documents available from the Department of National Defence’s Directorate
of History (e.g. the recently-opened Raymont series).
The paper shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, senior officials within the Diefenbaker
government, including the Prime Minister after 1962, were not altogether confused by the
strategic environment nor naive about their defence responsibilities and NATO obligations.
Some deliberately attempted to buy time and seek options to delay the acquisition of nuclear
weapons. Whereas ‘Defenders’ within the government worked to fulfill the nuclear
commitments, ‘Critics’ pursued alternatives which they deemed to be in the best interests of
war prevention. It seems a precedent was established in this period—these assumptions and
tactics would be reflected at various times in the beliefs and policy direction of the Trudeau
government.
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“Diefenbaker’s Legacy: New Ways of Thinking about Nuclear Weapons
and Canada’s Defence Policy”
Erika Simpson
Introduction:
Canada is unique in that we had the technological ability and resources to develop our
own nuclear weapons, or to acquire them from the United States, but chose not to. Why did
Canada choose not to acquire nuclear weapons? What contributed to our anti-nuclear stance?
This paper analyses the Diefenbaker government’s legacy with respect to Canadian defence
policy and the onset of ‘new thinking’ about nuclear weapons. It asks why Prime Minister
Diefenbaker and some of his advisers began to question whether Canada should take on a
nuclear role. What beliefs about nuclear weapons and the nature of the threat led some highlevel policy-makers to argue against acquiring nuclear warheads? What assumptions about the
dangers of abandonment, entrapment, and nuclear deterrence incited some decision-makers to
oppose the nuclear commitments? It is demonstrated that a new way of thinking—typical of
‘Critics’—significantly influenced decision-making and led toward the Diefenbaker
government’s contrasting record regarding nuclear weapons. Diefenbaker’s legacy was that he
was the first Prime Minister, and certainly not the last, to countenance Canada taking an antinuclear stand.
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Background: Firm Commitments to Acquire Nuclear Weapons
Beginning in 1957, the Diefenbaker government undertook firm commitments to
acquire five different nuclear weapons systems: the Bomarc missiles; the CF-101 air defence
interceptors or Voodoos deployed in Canada; the CF-104s or Starfighters deployed in
Europe as part of NATO’s striking force; the Lacrosse atomic missiles in Europe (which were
eventually replaced by the Honest John missiles) and a rarely-mentioned fifth commitment to
acquire nuclear depth charges and nuclear torpedoes for Canada’s maritime forces in the
North Atlantic.1
These decisions to acquire nuclear-capable systems were made at various times
between 1957 and 1960. Between 1960 and 1961 the government vacillated on whether or
not to acquire nuclear warheads. By late 1962 high-level decision-makers, including the Prime
Minister, expressed outright opposition to fulfilling the nuclear commitments. And in 1963 John
Diefenbaker campaigned on a platform opposed to the $700 million of nuclear commitments
his government had originally undertaken. Why did the government choose not to acquire
nuclear warheads? What factors contributed to its anti-nuclear stand?
Between 1957 and 1960 many different factors seemed to impell the government
toward acquiring nuclear systems.2 Furthermore, it seems apparent that other systemic- and

1 For an in-depth discussion of the nature and timing of all these commitments, see Erika Simpson

“Canada’s Contrasting NATO Commitments and the Underlying Beliefs and Assumptions of Defenders
and Critics” (an unpublished PhD dissertation submitted to the University of Toronto), 1995, ch. 5, pp. 247266.
2 For instance, in the international arena, new technological developments such as the development of the
Russian Sputnik in 1957, and the successful testing of the Bomarc B in 1959, prompted Prime Minister
Diefenbaker to support the Bomarc acquisition. Bilateral pressures such as the Congressional debate in the
United States against acquiring a full complement of Bomarcs, and the American transfer to Canada of the
Voodoos, incited military advisers like General George Pearkes and General Charles Foulkes to favour
acquiring these nuclear-capable weapons systems. NATO directives, including MC 14/2 and MC/48/2

4

state-level factors interacted to dissuade Canadian leaders between 1961 and 1963 from
fulfilling the commitments.3 Yet international pressures, regional factors, and domestic concerns
do not provide a sufficient explanation for these changes in Canadian defence policy. The fact
that there were, at the same time, some high-level decision-makers who favoured, and others
who opposed, fulfilling the nuclear commitments, indicates that an important reason for the
change in policy stemmed from individual decision-makers' different attitudes toward this issue.
To summarize, the first Minister of National Defence George Pearkes, his successor
Douglas Harkness, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff General Charles Foulkes, the Canadian
Ambassador to the United States (US) Arnold Heeney, and many other high-level defence
experts like the Chief of the Air Staff Hugh Campbell and Air Chief Marshal Frank Miller
favoured acquiring nuclear weapons. Cabinet Ministers like George Hees and civil servants like
the Secretary to the Cabinet Robert Bryce also supported nuclear acquisition. Initially the
Prime Minister was also convinced that Canada should acquire these weapons, but became

recommending defence preparations premised on using nuclear weapons from the outset, appeared to
sway Diefenbaker and his first Defence Minister George Pearkes. Financial imperatives such as the
cancellation of the Avro Arrow, and its 'substitution' with the relatively inexpensive Bomarc missile, also
seemed to affect Diefenbaker's attitude. In fact, military recommendations such as General Lauris Norstad's
briefing to Cabinet seemed to have a considerable influence on members of Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff.
Influential defence policy-makers had to consider all these sorts of international and domestic variables
when they decided to acquire five nuclear weapons systems For further discussion of the impact and
timing of these different factors, see Simpson “Canada’s Contrasting NATO Commitments, ch. 5, pp. 246298
3 International crises such as the Cuban missile crisis and the subsequent easing of tensions led some
decision-makers like Minister of External Affairs Howard Green to more avidly question the necessity to
acquire nuclear weapons. United Nations (UN) recommendations such as the Irish Resolution and
Canada's high-profile position in the UN's 18 Nation Disarmament Committee influenced the Cabinet's
debate. American behaviour such as President John Kennedy's 'failure' to consult during the Cuban missile
crisis and the publication of the US State Department's press release; electoral considerations such as the
influence of increasingly divided public opinion and Opposition Leader Lester Pearson's unexpected volteface regarding the nuclear issue; as well as domestic criticism in the form of an outpouring of letters and
complaints from groups like the Voice of Women, all contributed in some measure to different decisionmakers' lack of support for the nuclear weapons. For further discussion of the impact and timing of these
different factors, see Ibid.
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more uncertain beginning in 1959, after he appointed his good friend Howard Green as
Minister of External Affairs.
Howard Green and Norman Robertson, Green’s Deputy Minister of External Affairs,
strongly opposed acquiring nuclear weapons. With the assistance of George Ignatieff,
Diefenbaker’s special advisor on nuclear issues, the ‘trio’ sought to delay the acquisition
process, and to advise Diefenbaker against acquiring the nuclear weapons. Although the
growing peace movement, and the public’s increasing anti-Americanism also pushed the Prime
Minister to rethink the nuclear issue, there is no doubt that these three tried to delay, if not
reverse, the Prime Minister’s stated policy.
In other words, the underlying attitudes and beliefs of individual policy-makers
significantly influenced defence policy-making. Mounting evidence indicates that the
government’s rejection of nuclear weapons stemmed from new ways of thinking about
everything from the nature of the threat to the suitability of nuclear deterrence strategy. This
was a new way of thinking and arguing first espoused by Howard Green, Norman Robertson,
George Ignatieff, and eventually John Diefenbaker.
This new way of thinking was not always logical. It was sometimes incoherent and
confused. But it was embedded in a related set of assumptions which will be referred to here
as typical of ‘Critics’ or New Thinkers. And it was a Weltanschaung reflected later in the
approach and policy direction of the Trudeau government.4

4 For an in-depth analysis of Trudeau’s worldview and the attitude of some of his advisers toward nuclear

weapons, see Ibid, chs. 3-4, pp. 107-237
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In order to appreciate the ‘new thinking’ espoused by Canadian leaders like John
Diefenbaker, we need first to overview the main elements of old traditional thinking—typical of
‘Defenders’. We cannot appreciate the unique contribution of new thinkers without briefly
overviewing the core assumptions made by Defenders.5

The Underlying Beliefs and Assumptions of Defenders:
1. Defenders feared abandonment:
Defenders feared that NATO’s close ties, especially among the US, Canada, and the
United Kingdom (UK), were threatened unless Canada maintained, if not strengthened, its
defence commitments, for example by acquiring nuclear warheads. Defenders often put
forward fearful scenarios that if Canada’s military commitments were weakened or reneged
upon, Canada would be in danger of deserting its closest allies and being itself abandoned—
isolated. For instance, the Ministers of National Defence, George Pearkes and then Douglas
Harkness, and many other defence officials, like Charles Foulkes and Frank Miller, often put
forward forbidding scenarios arguing that if the government failed to acquire nuclear systems,
the country would be in danger of neglecting its allies and running the risk of suffering from US
retaliation. These kinds of persistent concerns that the Canadian government was in danger of
neglecting its friends and allies, and therefore could suffer from an array of negative

5 Unfortunately, space constraints prevent an in-depth analysis of traditional thinking using examples from

the declassified documents, letters, diaries and memoranda of ‘Defenders’. For a comprehensive survey of
the evidence leading to this kind of overview, see Ibid, pp. 107-182, 299-367. Instead, the main elements of
the traditional way of thinking are briefly summarized. Notably some policy-makers advocated certain
beliefs more strongly than others. The profile paints the broad brushstrokes of a mind-set; but no one
decision-maker can be held up as a perfect example of a ‘Defender’—or a ‘Critic’.
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consequences, were categorized together as evidence of a wide-spread tendency among
Defenders to fear abandonment, as opposed to entrapment.
2. Defenders believed Canada should pursue closer ties to the allies through
established kinds of military commitments:
Secondly, Defenders assumed Canada should pursue closer ties to the allies through
established kinds of military commitments. Obviously Canadian decision-makers have
suggested a variety of ways to signal close military ties to Europe and the US. But the marked
tendency among Defenders was to advocate 'traditional' and 'established' ways of fostering
such ties. At that time, in the early 1960s, established methods involved commitments to
maintain or increase the number of Canadian Forces personnel earmarked for NATO
purposes, particularly the number of Forces deployed overseas in Europe; promises to
modernize or to ear-mark more weapons systems and equipment to the Forces in NATO,
particularly the Canadian Forces in Europe (CFE); and commitments to maintain or increase
the percentage of the federal government's defence budget and the percentage of Gross
National Product (GNP) directed toward the defence of the Alliance.
3. Defenders believed the external threat to the Alliance was opportunistic and
aggressive:
Defenders have been distinguished thus far by their beliefs about the dangers of abandonment
and their assumptions about the imperative of pursuing closer ties to the allies through
traditional means. Another core belief of Defenders related to their predominant perceptions of
'the threat' to the Alliance. From 1949 to 1960, many Defenders perceived the external threat
to the Alliance as an aggressive and opportunistic bloc. But their actual references to the nature
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of the threat, behind-the-scenes, were relatively infrequent because it seems their perceptions
of the threat now formed the ‘backdrop’ of their thinking. Rather than dwell on the threat,
discuss whether the Soviet Union was insecure or opportunistic, or consider whether the
Communist World was monolithic or divided, Defenders simply assumed the threat from the
‘USSR’, ‘Communism’, ‘Nikita Khruschev’, and/or ‘Marxism-Leninism’ was aggressive and
opportunistic. Instead Defenders focused their intellectual energy upon analysing the the allies’
foreseeable intentions, especially the United States’ likely reactions.
4. Defenders assumed Canada and the Alliance's weapons were necessary and nonthreatening:
Fourthly, Defenders were inclined to view Canada and NATO's weapons systems as
necessary and non-threatening—rather benignly. They tended to downplay Canada's
capabilities and to regard our weapons systems and intentions as 'defensive', not 'offensive'.6
Although others criticized select NATO weapons for being potentially offensive, first-strike
systems, Defenders tended to portray Canada and the Alliance's weapons systems as part of a

6 Notably, as this research focuses on the psychological milieu, not the operational milieu, questions about

whether Canada and the other allied countries actually possessed 'offensive' or 'defensive' weapons are
unimportant—what is important is whether leaders themselves regarded Canada and the Alliance's
weapons as non-threatening and ‘defensive’. By way of explanation, one could distinguish between
offensive and defensive weapons in a variety of ways. Offensive versus defensive weapons might be
distinguished in geographical terms: if a weapon can be effectively used abroad, on the adversary's
territory, than it is offensive and if it can be used at home, once an attack has taken place, then it is
defensive. The offensive/defensive distinction could also be based, however, on 'range' variables (e.g.
immobile, local, limited versus extensive, long, highly mobile) or 'impact' variables (e.g. high explosive,
weapon of mass destruction, chemical, toxic, biological, nuclear). A weapon might also be distinguished on
the basis of whether it is strategic versus tactical: a weapon which is capable of reaching the enemy's
homeland or attacking deep behind the enemy's echelons might be classified as strategic and offensive
while a weapon which operates on or close to the battlefield might be conceived of as tactical and
defensive. Alternatively, as some critics like Pierre Trudeau argued, weapons could also be distinguished
as offensive or defensive with reference to the subjectively-perceived capabilities of the systems (e.g. the
subjective motivations attached to them). In other words, the best judge of whether a system (e.g. the CF104 strike-reconaissance aircraft) was offensive or defensive could be the adversary, the Soviet Union.
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second-strike deterrent. (For example, the CF-104s in Europe were considered to be
‘defensive’, not ‘offensive’, until Pierre Trudeau began questioning this basic assumption in
1969). Whereas Defenders, like the Minister of National Defence Douglas Harkness,
constantly referred to Canada’s Bomarcs and CF-101s as defensive, they avoided discussing
the possible offensive role of Canadian weapons systems, like the CF-104s. Indeed, it appears
from a perusal of the records of Cabinet meetings and high-level debates that most Canadian
leaders did not make subtle distinctions between offensive versus defensive weapons on
objective grounds or commonly-accepted technical definitions. Rather the general tendency
among Defenders was to assume Canada’s weapons systems were ‘defensive’, and not
consider whether the Soviet Union might perceive Canadian weapons systems as somehow
provocative or tension-producing.
5. Defenders believed deterrence doctrine was suitable and reliable:
Finally many influential decision-makers premised their support for maintaining, if not
strengthening Canada's nuclear commitments on deterrence doctrine. Most expressed
considerable faith in deterrence. This faith was retained as nuclear strategy evolved from
‘massive retaliation’ in the 1950s to ‘flexible response’ in the 1960s. For example, before
1957 most Defenders believed 'credible deterrence' relied mainly on the United States'
monopoly of ballistic nuclear missiles.7 By the late 1950s, many Defenders assumed deterrence

7 Until 1949, only the United States had developed thermonuclear weapons. The first Soviet explosion of an

atomic bomb in 1949 was followed four years later by the development of a hydrogen nuclear bomb. But it
was not until 1957, with the launch of the Sputnik, that military strategists in the United States and Canada
generally recognized that there now existed a 'balance of terror' between the US and the USSR. This
balance also had attendant implications for deterrence strategy—implications which came to be
appreciated around 1959-1960.
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doctrine had to be based on the threat of 'massive retaliation'.8 And in the 1960s, deterrence
doctrine evolved such that a credible deterrent at all levels was thought necessary so as to
ensure 'flexible' response.9 Despite all these changes in nuclear strategy, however, most
Canadians understood the basic principles of
elementary deterrence strategy, including Diefenbaker, and behind-the-scenes argued that
Canada had to fulfill its nuclear commitments or run the risk of undermining deterrence.
Thus, to summarize a great deal of newly-declassified evidence, many Cabinet
Ministers and defence advisers recommended modernizing Canada's weapons systems with
nuclear weapons because of their beliefs about the dangers of abandonment; the nature of the
threat; the utility of nuclear weapons; and the reliability and suitability of deterrence. Beginning
in 1957, the Defence Minister General Pearkes, supported by his senior adviser General
Foulkes, argued in favour of acquiring these weapons systems for the Canadian Forces. The
Prime Minister initially relied a great deal upon their assessments. Whereas Diefenbaker was
unsure of himself at the 1957 NATO Council meeting, and perhaps confused about the nature
of the commitments he was undertaking, there could be no doubt that between 1957 and 1961
the Prime Minister also favoured acquiring these nuclear weapons. Behind-the-scenes and in
private conversations, Ambassador Arnold Heeney, Air Chief Marshal Frank Miller, Chief of
the Air Staff Hugh Campbell, Associate Defence Minister Pierre Sevigny, Cabinet Minister

8 John Foster Dulles first promulgated the doctrine of massive retaliation in 1954. It suggested that the US

would retaliate with considerable force, possibly including nuclear weapons, anywhere in the world.
9 The strategy of ‘flexible response’ was officially adopted by NATO in 1967, however, it had been
unofficial doctrine since the early 1960s. According to the Ad Hoc Committee on Defence Policy in 1963:
"Flexible response is in a sense a generalization of the concept of a limited war. It is based upon the
proposition that the Western Alliance as a whole and the United States in particular should not be placed
in a position of excessive reliance upon nuclear weapons or, more generally, of requiring to employ force in
a manner incompatible with Western aims and objectives. The principle of flexible response places
increased emphasis upon the provision of conventional forces. It involves reduced dependence upon
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons although it does not reduce the requirement for these capabilities."
DND, Directorate of History [hereafter DHist], R.J. Sutherland (Chairman), et al “Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on Defence Policy”, p. 14 [SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY].
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George Hees, and the Secretary to the Cabinet Robert Bryce were also vigorous advocates of
the nuclear commitments. Taken together, the presence within the inner circle of decisionmaking of these influential Defenders contributed to the government's support for the
acquisition of nuclear weapons.10
In other words, Canada's decision to acquire nuclear weapons cannot be attributed to
international, technological, and strategic developments beyond the control of the Diefenbaker
government. The underlying beliefs of key political leaders were important factors impelling the
government to favour acquiring nuclear weapons. The 1957 NATO Council directives,
General Norstad's briefing to Cabinet, Diefenbaker's cancellation of the Avro Arrow, and the
launch of the Sputnik, all influenced defence decision-making, however, key Canadian leaders
supported the acquisition of nuclear weapons for the Canadian Forces because of their beliefs
about the dangers of abandonment; the salience of the Soviet threat; the utility of nuclear
weapons; and the importance of buttressing deterrence
Finally, it is important to note that within the inner circle, there were at first no highlevel decision-makers who were opposed to, or even critical, of the nuclear commitments. The
views of the first Minister of External Affairs Sidney Smith had not yet crystallized and, until
Howard Green assumed office, Deputy Minister Norman Robertson felt uncomfortable about
putting forward his growing concerns.11 The Prime Minister also did not encourage debate and
discussion among his staff and advisers—indeed, with reference to defence matters, he initially
relied on his own opinions and the advice of Pearkes12 and Foulkes.13 Rather than discuss the
10 For analysis and evidence, see Simpson “Canada’s Contrasting Commitments...”, ch. 6, pp. 183-245. This

is not to say, however, that it was solely the presence of ‘Defenders’ which accounted for the
government's initial support for the nuclear commitments. Other factors such as the climate of opinion
among the NATO allies favouring nuclear modernization, along with new technological developments and
American pressure to acquire the CF-101s and Bomarcs, contributed to the outcome. But there can be no
doubt that the main elements of the belief system of Defenders played an important contributory role.
11 Interview of Basil Robinson, September 14, 1992. For more on Robertson’s views, see also Basil
Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), p. 108; Knowlton Nash,
Kennedy and Diefenbaker, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990), p. 84; and J.L. Granatstein, A Man of
Influence: Norman Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-1968, (Ottawa: Deneau, 1981), pp. 336-363
12 Notably General Pearkes was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia in 1960 and Douglas
Harkness became the new Minister of National Defence. Whereas the Prime Minister had accorded General
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matter with External Affairs' officials or submit the question to Parliamentary debate,
Diefenbaker relied upon the advice of his senior defence officials. During this time period,
Howard Green was also still a backbencher; he did not become Minister of External Affairs
until June 1959. Another potential critic of the government's stance, George Ignatieff, did not
return from the UK to act as Diefenbaker's adviser on nuclear issues until January 1961. In
other words, defence decision-making was dominated by key policy-makers who shared many
beliefs and assumptions typical of Defenders. That it might not be necessary to acquire the
nuclear warheads in order to demonstrate Canada's continued commitment to NATO and
NORAD was an idea not yet countenanced. It was not until Howard Green took office that
the Prime Minister began to waiver and vacillate about whether or not to fulfill these
commitments.
Accordingly, the remainder of this paper overviews the kinds of beliefs which led some
to recommend de-emphasizing and restructuring Canada's nuclear commitments. It argues that
a few influential decision-makers possessed belief systems more typical of ‘Critics’ in the
period between 1959 and 1963. And it explores in greater detail their underlying assumptions
regarding the dangers of entrapment; the nature of the threat; and the limitations of different
weapons systems and strategies.14 What were the main elements of ‘new thinking’?15
Pearkes much authority and influence, Harkness was not as close to the Prime Minister nor as highlyesteemed. Although he proved to be a vigorous Defender who argued in favour of acquiring the nuclear
weapons with conviction and energy, Harkness was not able to convince the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet of his views.
13 General Foulkes' resignation in 1960, in opposition to the government's vacillating policy regarding the
nuclear weapons, and Arnold Heeney's ill-health in 1961, forcing his eventual replacement by Charles
Ritchie in January 1962, also weakened the force of the arguments put forward by Defenders in defence of
acquiring the nuclear weapons. Within the inner circles of defence decision-making, Douglas Harkness,
Pierre Sevigny, George Hees, Hugh Campbell, and Frank Miller, were confronted with an increasingly
indecisive Prime Minister and a vociferous External Affairs Minister, backed by a strongly-motivated
Deputy Minister and a determined Assistant Deputy Minister.
14 Due to the focus of this volume on John Diefenbaker, much of the remaining analysis centres on
Diefenbaker’s beliefs. Further evidence documenting the convictions and original arguments of the ‘trio’,
Howard Green, Norman Robertson, and George Ignatieff is found in Simpson “Canada’s Contrasting
Alliance Commitments...”, ch. 7, pp. 368-417
15 Notably, no one Canadian leader can be dogmatically categorized as a ‘critical new thinker’. But the basic
tenets of this belief system frequently appeared in private correspondence, personal memoranda, and the
Cabinet Conclusions. In generalizing about Critics’ core beliefs, it may also seem as if their ideas were more
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Substantive Beliefs and Assumptions of Critics
1. Critics feared entrapment:
In sharp contrast to Defenders, Critics were preoccupied with the dangers of
entrapment, not abandonment. They tended to be suspicious about the likelihood and possible
consequences of the allies drawing Canada into an armed confrontation. And they worried
about NATO undertakings, particularly American military objectives.
Prime Minister Diefenbaker's fears about entrapment first began to affect his decisionmaking in 1960, about a year after Howard Green was appointed to External Affairs. Over
time, these suspicions intensified. Diefenbaker expressed his strongest fears about the dangers
and consequences of entrapment during the Cuban missile crisis, when the Cabinet debated
whether or not to alert the Canadian Forces. From the time Howard Green took office in
1959, however, he was suspicious of the US and fearful that the Alliance leader could draw
Canada unwillingly into a dangerous confrontation.
For example, in the emergency Cabinet meetings during the Cuban crisis, Diefenbaker
and Green feared the country was in danger of becoming entangled in what they called
“domestic” and “Cuban” affairs. Their comments during Cabinet meetings reflected their fears
of what they described as "embroilment" or entrapment. Over two days of discussions, they
argued that, "Canada was not automatically embroiled anytime the US was but practically,
however, Canada was." They believed "there were great dangers in rushing in at this time" and
"quick action brought quick judgement". Furthermore, Canada should not appear to be
"stampeded". 16 In particular, their fears about "embroilment" impelled them to recommend the
logical and carefully considered than they were at that time. It is important to remember that their ‘new
thinking’ during the early 1960s regarding difficult dilemmas involving defence and deterrence may now
seem familiar and possibly obvious to Canadians. However, it was daring ‘new thinking’ then, decades
before Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and the peace movement popularized and legitimized these sorts of
criticisms .
16 Privy Council Office [hereafter PCO], Cabinet Conclusions, October 23, 1962, pp. 4-5; October 25th, p. 16,
[SECRET]. Notably, the Cabinet Conclusions were obtained under the Access to Information Act from the
PCO but are now also on deposit at the Public Archives of Canada [hereafter PAC]. These records of
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government behave normally and deliberately; that the troop rotation to Europe be deferred;
and the government delay its decision to alert the Canadian Forces.17
Underlying these arguments about the dangers of "rushing in" was an assumption that
alerting the forces would only increase the likelihood of war. In one emergency Cabinet
meeting, Diefenbaker's concerns about war impelled him to caution his colleagues that
‘Canadian mothers did not want their sons to be killed in any foreign war’ and ‘the Cuba
business was no affair of Canada's.’18 Indeed, his fear that the US could drag Canada
unwillingly into an armed confrontation, possibly a nuclear war, was such that when the British
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan sent an urgent message, Diefenbaker's fear of entrapment
incited him to entirely misinterpret the content of that message to his colleagues. The Prime
Minister reported to Cabinet that the British Prime Minister thought the Soviet Union was
"balanced on the knife's edge of indecision" and "any hostile act might precipitate a Russian
attack." Diefenbaker proceeded to take this message to mean that alerting Canada's defence
might be just enough to precipitate the outbreak of war.19 Later, after the crisis ended, it
became apparent that Macmillan had strongly supported Kennedy throughout. Although the
British Prime Minister scoffed at Diefenbaker for his "faint heart", it was not Diefenbaker's
fears about Khrushchev's intentions which provoked him to oppose alerting the Forces. It was

Cabinet meetings, usually written by Robert Bryce, often attribute points made by Ministers not to specific
individuals but to ‘some Ministers’ or to ‘the Cabinet’. However, comments made by the Prime Minister,
the Minister of External Affairs, and the Minister of National Defence were usually specifically attributed.
Further evidence that it was Diefenbaker and Green who made these sorts of arguments in Cabinet is
confirmed by other accounts of the Cabinet meetings. For example, see PAC, Douglas Harkness Papers,
MG 32, B19, vol. 57, "Unnumbered series on 'The Nuclear Arms Crisis'"; Patrick Nicholson Vision and
Indecision, (Longmans Canada Limited: Don Mills, Ontario, 1968), pp. 158-159; Nash Kennedy &
Diefenbaker, p. 199; and Pierre Sevigny, This Game of Politics, (McClelland and Stewart Limited: Toronto,
1965), p. 256
17 PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, October 23, 1962, pp. 4-5; October 24, 1962, p. 5, [SECRET]; and, PAC,
Douglas Harkness Papers, MG 32, B19, vol. 57, "Unnumbered series on 'The Nuclear Arms Crisis'".
18 According to Patrick Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, p. 159.
19 Ibid., p. 165; Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, p. 199.
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his beliefs about the escalatory tendencies of American "military leaders"20 which likely
accounted for the way in which he reinterpreted Macmillan's message to the Cabinet.
Yet immediately after the Cuban missile crisis ended, despite his heightened fears of
entrapment, Diefenbaker ordered Harkness and Green to conduct absolutely secret
negotiations with the US in order to acquire nuclear warheads based on either the ‘joint
control’ or ‘missing parts’ approaches.21 Diefenbaker seemed to accept the necessity of
accepting nuclear warheads so long as the US consented to his concept of ‘joint control’. By
1961 Diefenbaker interpreted this nebulous concept to mean that Canada would accept ‘joint
control' over all the Canadian nuclear weapons systems so long as President Kennedy used his
executive powers to reinterpret the 'present law' in such a way as to permit the 'necessary
agreement' with Canada.22 Even during his first meeting with Kennedy, before their relationship
became embittered, Diefenbaker referred to the imperative of obtaining 'joint control and joint
custody' over the nuclear weapons.23
It may have been that Diefenbaker insisted upon some measure of joint control
because he meant somehow to curtail, if not harness, the US from any ill-considered resort to
the use of Canada's nuclear weapons.24 Indeed, in later years Diefenbaker's close aide, Basil
20 PCO Cabinet Conclusions, October 24, 1962, p. 7, [SECRET]. Notably, the original classification of a

document (e.g. TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, etc.) is notated in the footnotes, although in
most cases much of the original document has been declassified. Despite the ‘thirty-year’ rule, however,
large sections of the Cabinet minutes are still classified mainly because of Sections 13(1) and 15(1) of the
Access to Information Act.
21 PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, October 30, 1962, p. 10, [TOP SECRET].
22 PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, February 21, 1961, p. 1, [SECRET].
23 PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, August 25, 1961, p. 6, item k), [SECRET]. Notably, Diefenbaker also told

Cabinet after this meeting with Kennedy in 1961 that, "The President had said he would go as far as
possible to meet the Canadian position in the matter, and there had been reliable reports in the last few
days that members of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee would agree to joint control with
Canada over nuclear weapons stockpiled in this country for Canadian use. It would not have been possible
two years ago to obtain U.S. agreement to this principle. A change in U.S. law might not be required to give
effect to an agreement to share with Canada joint control over nuclear weapons stockpiled in Canada."
These comments do seem to indicate that some measure of Canadian joint control, as Diefenbaker
conceived it, was being seriously discussed in the United States in 1961.
24 In another example, Diefenbaker told Cabinet in 1961 that not to obtain joint control "would be an
abandonment of responsibility on the part of Canada." PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, August 25, 1961, p. 4,
[SECRET].
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Robinson, explained that in his view, the Prime Minister's reason for seeking joint control
seemed to be "to satisfy himself" that nuclear weapons would not be used, except with
agreement of the Canadian government. According to Robinson, Diefenbaker was not
motivated simply by "crass politics" but believed it was his "political responsibility" to acquire
joint control—indeed, the Prime Minister was "afraid" of being accused of not having ensured
Canada an equal say in the decision to use nuclear weapons.25 Diefenbaker's autobiography
also seems to confirm this assessment. As he wrote, he had deemed it "essential that the
Canadian government be in as strong a position as possible to bring its influence to bear on any
decision to use nuclear weapons, and perhaps to deter the United States from any possible illconsidered decisions in this respect."26
Prime Minister Diefenbaker's belief that Canada was in danger of entrapment seemed
to stem from images he gained while in office. At about the same time that he began waivering
about the nuclear acquisitions, his closest advisers began to worry about the Prime Minister's
growing 'anti-Americanism'. When Arnold Heeney questioned Diefenbaker closely in 1960,
the Prime Minister's explanation reflected his first-hand impressions of the United States gained
while he was in power. Diefenbaker explained that "the avalanche of anti-Americanism" in
Canada stemmed from the widespread impression that the United States was pushing other
people around; from distrust of the American military; from the economic aggressiveness of
American interests; and, he added almost as an afterthought, from the adverse trading
position.27 The Prime Minister's imagery of the American leadership began to affect his
decision-making in 1960, well before Kennedy became President. His steadily-mounting
impression that the United States' leadership was aggressive and its military leaders were

25 Basil Robinson interview, September 14, 1992. Interestingly, thirty years later, when asked what he

thought Diefenbaker had meant by joint control exactly, Basil Robinson threw his hands up in the air and
shrugged. Robinson was not sure that Diefenbaker "fully understood all the jargon."
26 John Diefenbaker, One Canada 1962-1967, (Scarborough, Ontario: Macmillan-NAL Publishing, 1977), vol.
3, p. 80.
27 PAC, Arnold Heeney Papers, MG 30, E 144, vol. 2, file "Memoir, 1960, Chapter 15, diary, #2", August 30,
1960 entry; see also Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, p. 58.
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untrustworthy seems also to have been influenced by other first-hand experiences. After
establishing NORAD, he came to regard the agreement as having been presented in 1957 on
false pretences.28 He was frustrated about his unsuccessful effort to sell the Avro Arrow to the
US, and doubly so because he had to acquire American-made interceptors afterwards.29 He
also did not want to admit that he had been obliged to personally intervene to ensure
reinstatement of the Bomarc programme.30 With the inauguration in 1961 of a young and
seemingly impetuous President, Diefenbaker's suspicions grew. They were undergirded by the
Bay of Pigs incident in April 1961 and came to entirely preoccupy him once he found the
memo, "What We Want from Ottawa Trip". 31 By 1963, according to George Ignatieff, the
Prime Minister's distrust of the US had grown to the point that he truly believed he had been
tricked into accepting a defence policy for Canada which was subordinated to a certain type of
weapons programme and to the interest of a foreign government.32
Diefenbaker's distrust of the United States intensified while in office and contributed to
his growing fear of entrapment. Yet it is notable that the Prime Minister retained considerable
faith in Britain and the other allies. Even during the Berlin crisis in September 1961, the Prime

28 According to an interview of George Ignatieff by Roger Hill, Senior Research Fellow, Canadian Institute

for International Peace and Security, “Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security Transcripts”
[hereafter CIIPS Transcripts], (unpublished transcripts: Ottawa, 1987), p. 104. Notably, these are verbatim
transcripts of interviews conducted by Roger Hill, David Cox, Nancy Gordon, et al. Excerpts from these
transcripts are cited with the permission of Roger Hill.
29 According to Ignatieff, "he [Diefenbaker] was told by National Defence after he had signed NORAD,
there was no need for such an aircraft, because the United States would take care of all that and they would
not buy the Arrow in any shape or form; they had all kinds of aircraft and missiles and we were going into
the missile age anyway. And in his fury, I think, Diefenbaker not only made the decision to scrap the
Arrow, but he said that every Arrow plane, even the few models that had been made, had to be destroyed."
CIIPS Transcripts, p. 118.
30 John Diefenbaker, One Canada: The Years of Achievement 1956-1962, (Toronto: McMillan, Canada,
1976), vol. 2, pp. 51-52, 60.
31 For a detailed account of Diefenbaker's growing suspicions once Kennedy came into power, see Nash,
Kennedy & Diefenbaker. Nash argues Diefenbaker's perception of the United States shifted because he
heartily disliked Kennedy. In fact, Diefenbaker's 'anti-American' imagery began to affect his decisionmaking in 1960, well before Kennedy became President.
32 As Ignatieff recalled: “It affected his whole attitude in relation to the United States. I mean a lot has been
said about his personal antipathy to a young President such as Kennedy. But it had this background in the
defence issues, where he felt he had been cornered into a subordinate position and contrary to all his
convictions.” CIIPS transcripts, p. 118.
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Minister was hardly trepidatious that the other NATO allies would draw Canada, unwillingly,
into an armed confrontation. One possible explanation for this is that when Diefenbaker
dwelled on the intentions of the other NATO allies, he tended to focus on the United Kingdom.
He may not have been inclined to suspect British motives because of his attachment to the
British Crown. Over time, however, he became more wary of entrapment in an American-led
initiative.

19

2. Critics believed Canada's established military ties to the allies should be
restructured and de-emphasized:
Critics sought to revise and restructure Canada's traditional military ties to the other
allies. In particular, they opposed increasing the number of Canadian Forces for NATO
purposes, including the number of personnel deployed overseas. They were critical of the
government's promises to modernize and deploy more weapons systems and equipment to
NATO. And they were generally intent upon limiting the percentage of the federal
government's defence budget and the percentage of the country's GNP directed toward the
Alliance.
With respect to this sort of conviction, it is important to note that between 1957 and
1963, most high-level decision-makers, including Prime Minister Diefenbaker and Howard
Green, steadfastly rejected the complete severing of Canada's association with NATO—what
they called 'neutralism'. In fact, Diefenbaker claimed that he could not abide neutralists and
heaped scorn on James Minifie, "the reigning advocate of neutralism" and a "Washington-based
journalist and expatriate for whom Canada wasn't good enough."33 Nevertheless, among the
decision-makers at the centre and core of defence policy-making, Green, Robertson, and
Ignatieff, consistently believed the government should restructure its nuclear commitments to
NATO. Beginning in 1960, Diefenbaker also sought to de-emphasize Canada's nuclear ties.
He did this, for example, by waivering and advocating new proposals like 'joint control' and
'missing parts'—propositions which seemed designed to interminably delay negotiations.34

33 PAC, Arnold Heeney Papers, MG 30, E 144, vol. 2, file "Memoir, 1960, Chapter 15, diary, "#2", August 30,

1960 entry. Notably, James Minifie was the author of a book which argued for Canadian neutrality.
Peacemaker or Powdermonkey: Canada's Role in a Revolutionary World, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart,
1960).
34 For instance, the joint control approach was premised on the condition that the nuclear weapons would
not be obtained pending a complete break-down of disarmament negotiations. The missing parts idea was
based on the condition that the United States would consent to store the nuclear warheads or parts of the
warheads on American soil and, in the event that Canada authorized their deployment during an
emergency, the US would undertake to transport the parts to Canada and install them in the Bomarc
missiles and Voodoo interceptors.
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Further to this point, while Critics recommended Canada de-emphasize and restructure
its traditional military commitments to the Alliance, during the early 1960s some Critics did so
without first assessing the strategic rationale and implications of the original commitments. For
instance, it was sometimes recommended that certain weapons systems be cancelled, reduced
or not acquired because Critics worried about their attendant implications for signalling
Canada's intentions to escalate, rather than de-escalate, the arms spiral. Instead, Critics
frequently recommended options and alternative proposals to Canada's traditional military
commitments to NATO because they wanted, above all, to delay or depart from the
government's previous course of action or policy direction.
In this regard, there are a number of examples of Green, Robertson, Ignatieff, and
Diefenbaker (beginning in 1960) recommending Canada not fulfill its military commitments
without fully assessing these commitments' strategic purpose and implications. For example,
during the Cuban missile crisis, Diefenbaker's hesitation to alert the Canadian Forces and his
impromptu proposal for an "on-site inspection team" enraged President Kennedy and his envoy
Livingston Merchant because it indicated the Canadian Prime Minister distrusted their
intentions and photographic evidence.35 It was apparent that Diefenbaker had also not
explored his own proposal for an on-site inspection team because, as Green pointed out later
that week in Cabinet, "the difficulty was [with the on-site proposal] that neither the Russians
nor Cuba had denied that missile bases were established in Cuba". 36
These decision-makers' opposition to fulfilling the government's military commitments
and inclination to advocate alternative proposals was best exemplified by their advocacy of the
'joint control' and 'missing parts' approaches. High-level military advisers, like General Charles
Foulkes, argued that the negotiations with the US to acquire the nuclear weapons would need
to be based on the principle that the nuclear warheads for the Canadian forces in Europe, and

35 According to Dalton Camp in Peter Stursberg, Diefenbaker: Leadership Lost 1962-1967 (Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 1976), p. 19 and Nash, Kennedy & Diefenbaker, p. 189.
36 PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, October 25, 1962, p. 16, [SECRET].
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the interceptors in Canada, would be supplied by the US and remain American property. They
also maintained that the nuclear weapons stockpiled in Europe would be guarded by NATO's
soldiers, and custody and maintenance would have to remain with the US.37 On the other
hand, Diefenbaker, Green, Robertson, and Ignatieff espoused 'joint control'. As Diefenbaker
explained, "We have made it equally clear that we shall not in any event consider nuclear
weapons until, as a sovereign nation, we have equality of control—a joint control". 38
Yet it is unlikely that Diefenbaker fully assessed the strategic rationale of rejecting the
nuclear weapons and the military implications of promoting the joint control and missing parts
approaches. Together, Green and Robertson, with some assistance from Ignatieff, were the
formulators of the joint control approach. As Ignatieff later explained, "We came up with our
own formula for defusing the government's nuclear dilemma.... To the beleagured Prime
Minister, this compromise solution was a welcome peg on which to hang his own indecision,
and he clung to it even after it became obvious that it wasn't strong enough to save his
government."39 The missing parts approach also grew out of the trio's conversations.40 Their
suggestion that nuclear warheads be stored on American territory and delivered quickly in the
event of emergency seemed designed to bridge gaps among opposing viewpoints. The missing
parts approach sought to satisfy Diefenbaker's desire for joint control so as to deter American
escalatory tendencies; it endeavoured to satisfy Green, who was fervently opposed to nuclear
weapons; and it sought to mollify Harkness, who worried about Canada's defence of the
deterrent.

37 For example, see General C. Foulkes on CBC TV, "Citizen's Forum", November 6, 1960, transcribed in

News & Views, no. 92, November 22, 1960, p. 11.
38 For Diefenbaker's own reference list of his statements referring to joint control, see John G. Diefenbaker
Centre [hereafter JGD Centre], Prime Minister's Office, vol. 74, file 10385, "Public Statements by Members of
the Government Regarding the Acquisition and Storage of Nuclear Weapons", November 24, 1960.
Notably, permission to peruse the original speeches and notes of Prime Minister Diefenbaker was originally
granted from the JGD Centre.
39 George Ignatieff, The Making of a Peacemonger, (Toronto: Penguin Book), 1985, p. 189.
40 According to Nash, Kennedy & Diefenbaker, p. 152.
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Both the joint control and missing part approaches demonstrated the extent to which
these decision-makers were prepared to advocate alternative strategies which were designed to
delay or depart from the government's previous course of action. Although their
recommendations advocating joint control or missing parts were attributed to ignorance and
naivety about strategic matters, they indicated these Critics wanted, above all, for Canada to
delay or depart from its previous policy direction toward acquiring nuclear weapons. Indeed, as
Ignatieff later admitted, "We knew all along that the [joint control] proposal was no more than a
holding action, that the Americans would never accept joint control with regard to the use of
nuclear weapons. But in the meantime it did enable Howard Green to wage a number of
successful campaigns on behalf of the one cause, which, in his mind, overshadowed all others in
importance, namely arms control."41
3. Critics believed the external threat was exaggerated and misunderstood:
While Defenders believed the Soviet threat was aggressive and opportunistic, Critics
tended to believe that the ‘Communist threat’ was exaggerated and that the evil intentions of
the ‘Soviet Union’ were being misinterpreted.
The most striking evidence of the turn-around in the Prime Minister's assessment of the
threat is found in the declassified record of the Cabinet meetings during the Cuban missile
crisis. Diefenbaker believed American leaders were exaggerating and misinterpreting the threat
from Khrushchev. However, the Prime Minister had begun to project a strikingly different
image of the Soviet threat beginning in 1961. During the Berlin crisis, he suddenly noted it
should not be overlooked that the Soviet Union had fears too. Although Soviet policies
sometimes defied the laws of reason, it was important to seek to understand their vital interests,
objectives, and fears.42 A few months later, Diefenbaker referred to Mr. Khrushchev as a
"realist" who supported "a course of peace—a course of realism—a course in keeping with the

41 Ignatieff, The Making of a Peacemonger, p. 189.
42 JGD Centre, Speech Series Collection, vol. 65, file 996, "Partial Notes for an address to the Canadian Bar

Association", Winnipeg, September 1, 1961, p. 22.
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choice of the Canadian people". 43 By October 1962, Diefenbaker was so preoccupied with
the suspicious motives of President Kennedy and other "military leaders" that he hardly paused
during Cabinet meetings to consider Khrushchev's intentions—and when he did so, he
assumed a relatively benign view of Soviet motives. As was pointed out to his colleagues
during the emergency meeting of Cabinet on October 24, 1962, the USSR had some years
before a similar reason to complain about American missile bases ringing Soviet territory.44
Indeed, many years later, Diefenbaker still maintained that Khrushchev's behaviour during the
crisis was cautious and relatively moderate. As he wrote, "Khrushchev went out of his way to
cultivate a moderate and reasonable image."45
Whereas the threat Diefenbaker perceived from the Soviet Union and Mr. Khrushchev
faded over time, his impression of the US as a threat to international peace and security
intensified. For instance, instead of criticizing Khrushchev for secretly deploying missiles to
Cuba, he lambasted American officials for emphasizing to him that the substance of their
photographic evidence was secret and shortly afterwards revealing this information to the
press.46 Although the depth of Diefenbaker's suspicions was quickly evident to President
Kennedy due to Diefenbaker's impromptu proposal for an on-site inspection team, the Prime
Minister openly revealed his distrust of American intentions when he told reporters during the
crisis that, if his on-site inspection proposal was implemented, "the truth will be revealed."47
Diefenbaker also grew increasingly wary about American domestic politics and
concerned that certain American leaders were bent on inciting war. As was pointed out in
Cabinet in 1962, there were "domestic political overtones in the US decision" to confront the
Soviet Union over Cuba. Instead of focusing on Khrushchev's provocative intentions, it was
argued that the US could be responsible for provoking war by imposing a selective blockade

43 JGD Centre, Speech Series Collection, vol. 87, file 1122, May 28, 1962, p. 2.
44 PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, October 24, 1962, p. 2, [SECRET].
45 John Diefenbaker, One Canada 1962-1967, p. 71.
46 PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, October 24, 1962, p. 2, [SECRET].
47 Nash, Kennedy & Diefenbaker, p. 189.
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on Cuba.48 As the Prime Minister explained to Cabinet, certain military leaders in the US
appeared determined to fight the USSR—indeed, three years before, some of them had told
him that the United States could defeat the Russians any time before the autumn of 1962, but
that the outlook thereafter was less certain. 49
It seems Diefenbaker's gradual change of heart regarding the Soviet threat stemmed in
part from his realization that, "as a matter of survival", it was important the "freedom-loving
nations" sought, through the processes of diplomacy, to build on the hope of international
peace. Slowly the Prime Minister came to recognize that although Soviet foreign policy would
not be transformed, it was possible "to identify and to welcome certain modifications in the
Soviet approach to international problems." In particular, Diefenbaker emphasized that the
symbolic importance of the Soviet Union's participation in the UN's Special Disarmament
Committee could not be disregarded.50 The Prime Minister's fluctuating imagery of the threat
also stimulated changes in the way he processed information about the Soviet threat. During the
Cuban missile crisis, for instance, he suggested to his colleagues that Khrushchev's attempt to
deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba was understandable given the United States' prior deployment,
within striking distance of the Soviet Union, of nuclear missiles in Turkey. Whereas in 1958
Diefenbaker likely would have condemned Khrushchev for his actions, by 1962 he was trying
to empathize and see the strategic situation from the adversary's viewpoint.
In summary, for Diefenbaker (beginning in 1961), and other Critics like Green, and
Robertson, the main threat to Canada's security was not the Soviet bloc but the threat of
nuclear war arising out of both sides' stockpiles of nuclear weapons. In their view, the greatest
threat to Canadians was not the danger of armed attack but the possibility of miscalculated or
accidental war escalating uncontrollably. For these influential decision-makers, the threat of

48 PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, October 23, 1962, p. 4, [SECRET].
49 Ibid., October 24, 1962, p. 7, [SECRET].
50 For early evidence of his changing imagery, see for example JGD Centre, Diefenbaker Speech Series

Collection, vol. 30, file 779, speech to Michigan University, Lansing, USA, June 7, 1959, pp. 6, 18, 20.
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nuclear war was much more dangerous and salient than the threat from Mr. Khrushchev and
Russian missiles in Cuba.

4. Critics believed both sides' weapons were unnecessarily threatening:
Critics tended to view the weapons and force structures of both sides as problematic.
They frequently pointed out that many of NATO's weapons systems were unnecessary and
might be perceived as overly threatening. In particular, Critics worried that both blocs would
regard one another's forces and doctrine as provocative, thus prompting spiralling arms races
and the risk of uncontrollable escalation.
As more information circulated in the mid-1950s about the dangers of nuclear war,
some decision-makers began to recognize the drawbacks of these weapons and counsel
disarmament. For example, the opposition of Green, Robertson, and eventually Diefenbaker to
nuclear weapons was partly based on their exposure to information and disturbing facts about
the dangers of nuclear war. As Arnold Heeney recorded in his diary, the Minister of External
Affairs apparently shunned nuclear weapons. According to Heeney, "My judgment is that this
instinctive repulsion for nuclear involvement of any kind is at the base of Mr. G's [Green's] own
negative attitude over all defence matters, espec. [especially] where the United States, the
great nuclear power is involved."51 Like his Minister, Norman Robertson was also "absolutely
horrified that mankind would seriously contemplate using the nuclear weapon". 52 As Basil
Robinson explains, both Green and Robertson were exposed to the 'anti-nuclear' arguments
propounded in the mid-fifties by the peace movement, first in the UK and later in Canada.
Robertson particularly took the anti-nuclear viewpoint to heart, believing that once one

51 PAC, Arnold Heeney Papers, MG 30, E 144, vol. 2, file "Memoir, 1960, Chapter 15, diary #2", September

20, 1960 entry.
52 Interview of Basil Robinson, September 14, 1992. For more on Norman Robertson's anti-nuclear
convictions, see Robinson, Diefenbaker's World p. 108; Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, p. 84; and
Granatstein, A Man of Influence.
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understood the effect of a nuclear explosion, the only course was to shun nuclear weapons and
put them outside of mankind's experience.53
There is no doubt that the peace movements beginning in Britain in the 1950s and
spreading throughout Western Europe and North America in the 1960s and 1980s stimulated
many Canadian citizens to think about the dangers of nuclear war and to question the
assumptions undergirding deterrence. Letters, marches, and appeals drawing attention to the
dangers of war seemed to make an overwhelming impact on some leaders. For some decisionmakers, dismantling and destroying nuclear, conventional, biological, and chemical weapons
seemed to become the preferred option.
For example, Prime Minister Diefenbaker's beliefs appeared profoundly influenced by
impressions he received in the early 1960s as more people began to discuss the dangers of
nuclear war.54 Diefenbaker's assertions in January 1963 that "nuclear war is indivisible" and
"nuclear weapons as a universal deterrent are a dangerous solution" were purportedly based on
his reading of the Nassau Communique and ideas expressed by George W. Ball, the American
Under-Secretary of State.55 But the Prime Minister was also influenced by the mail he received
from anti-nuclear groups like the Voice of Women.56 Although very much swayed by Howard
Green, 57 Diefenbaker claimed to be considerably affected by the thousands of letters he

53 Interview of Basil Robinson, September 14, 1992. Robinson also speculates that Norman Robertson's

comparatively early exposure to the peace movement stemmed from his strong interest and close reading of
developments in UK politics. See also Granatstein, A Man of Influence, pp. 338-339.
54 Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, p. 159, Sevigny, This Game of Politics, p. 259. Notably, precise
information about the possible effect of nuclear weapons on the general population was not widely
circulated until the early 1960s. For instance, the public was not generally made aware until 1963 of the fact
that each CF-104 in Europe could carry a one-megaton bomb, equivalent to 1 million tons of TNT, or 50
times as powerful as the bomb which destroyed Hiroshima. As Dave McIntosh explained in 1963, "The
RCAF division in Europe, with eight squadrons of 18 CF-104s each, would thus have the power to destroy
144 cities at one blow." McIntosh, "Canadian CF-104s in Europe can carry 'Million-Ton' Bomb", Toronto
Star, (April 16, 1963).
55 Hansard, January 25, 1963, p. 3128.
56 For instance, see Nicholson Vision and Indecision, p. 159; Sevigny This Game of Politics, p. 259.
57 By 1962, Diefenbaker referred to Green as "one of the greatest leaders in the field of disarmament and
world peace" and someone who had achieved for Canada "an undisputed place in the field of international
affairs and the pursuit of peace for all mankind." JGD Centre, Prime Minister's Papers, vol. 87, file 1122,
"International Affairs-Defence Policy", May 28, 1962, p. 3.
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received reflecting changes in the general climate of opinion.58 Even though Diefenbaker
reasoned that people rarely wrote letters except to express opposition, he regarded his letters
to be a most useful cross-section of the public's understanding—and sometimes
misunderstanding—of the goals the government had set for itself.59 Yet it was also true that at
other times, if public opinion contradicted his own views, the Prime Minister seemed
unaffected.60
No doubt, the Prime Minister's well-honed political instincts, his practiced ability to
appraise public sentiment, and his many reliable sources helped him to read changes in the
electorate's beliefs.61 Whereas the Prime Minister's 'conversion' to an anti-nuclear stance was
not wholly driven by electoral considerations, it is true that Diefenbaker adeptly utilized trends
in domestic public opinion to undergird his anti-nuclear arguments; he quickly recognized that
anti-American sentiments could be useful to him for electoral purposes; he knew how to
capitalize on the “What We Want from Ottawa Trip” memo he found for electoral gain; and he
did not hesitate to use the State Department's press release to incite anti-American sentiment
during the 1963 election. In other words, the evidence indicates that Diefenbaker tended to

58 Generally speaking, Diefenbaker greatly relied on letters but not on public opinion polls to detect shifts

in public opinion. This is confirmed by Pierre Sevigny's remarks in Peyton Lyon, Canada in World Affairs:
1961-1963 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 71 and Harkness's comments in Peter Stursberg,
Leadership Lost 1962-1967, p. 25.
59 According to JGD Centre, Diefenbaker Speech Series Collection, vol. 59, file 967, "Notes for an Address
on 'The Nation's Business'," June 21, 1961, p. 1. Also according to Arnold Heeney's diary, Diefenbaker was
powerfully affected by the shift toward anti-Americanism which he detected in his letters beginning in
1959. PAC, Arnold D. P. Heeney Papers, MG 30, E 144, vol. 2, file "Memoir 1959, Chapter 15, diary #1",
March 29, 1959 entry.
60 A case in point was his assertion during a Cabinet meeting in February 1961 that the public's
appreciation of the need to have nuclear weapons had been weakened by the government's recent
emphasis on disarmament negotiations, but that negotiations to acquire the nuclear weapons should
continue. PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, February 17, 1961, p. 2, [SECRET].
61 Notably, there is no indication that polls were heavily influential. In 1961, for example, when the issue of
nuclear weapons began to attract greater public attention, the Cabinet briefly discussed poll results but
concluded that different polls produced diametrically opposite results. PCO, Cabinet Conclusions,
February 17, 1961, p. 2, [SECRET]. Certainly if polls had heavily influenced Diefenbaker and Green, they
would have supported the acquisition of nuclear warheads in January 1963 since the polls they saw
indicated that a strong majority favoured acquiring nuclear weapons for all the nuclear weapons systems.
PAC, Douglas Harkness Papers, MG 32, B19, vol. 57, "'The Nuclear Arms Question', Background
Correspondence, memoranda, etc.", "CTV Program Telepol", January 27, 1963.
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interpret letters, shifts in public opinion, and changes in the electorate's mood in light of his own
gradually-shifting belief system
Notably, an examination of the Prime Minister's own jottings reveal that by 1961
Diefenbaker believed that he himself would somehow be responsible if nuclear weapons were
used in a third world war. As he scrawled on his notes for a speech on radio, "the thought of a
third world war, especially one in which nuclear weapons would be used is a constant
companion of one who has the responsibility and trust which rests on me."62 It may have been
this sense of responsibility and trust which prompted him to begin cautioning that many of
NATO's weapons were unnecessary and might be perceived as posing an offensive threat.
Certainly by 1963 Diefenbaker felt compelled to explain to the House of Commons during his
Nassau speech that acquiring more nuclear weapons was a mistake and would add nothing
materially to our defences. In fact, the Prime Minister claimed during this speech that nuclear
war was indivisible; that there should be no further development of new nuclear power
anywhere in the world; and nuclear weapons as a universal deterrent would be a dangerous
solution.63
In part, Diefenbaker's conviction that both sides' stockpiles of nuclear weapons were
unnecessarily threatening seems to have been prompted by his personal sense of responsibility
to ensure the survival of millions of Canadians. But this belief probably also grew out of
Diefenbaker's regular weekend conversations with Howard Green. This Minister of External
Affairs believed nuclear weapons, worldwide, were threatening and dangerous—indeed, their
acquisition by Canada might lead, he thought, to spiralling arms proliferation in other regions of
the world, including the Middle East, and to heightened dangers of unintentional escalation.64

62 JGD Centre, Diefenbaker Speech Series Collection, vol. 56, file 950, "Speech on CBC Radio International",

May 5, 1961, p. 2.
63 Hansard, January 25, 1963, pp. 3129-3130
64 For example, see PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, August 23, 1961, p. 6, item c), [SECRET]. Notably, the
Cabinet Conclusions did not directly attribute this argument to Howard Green but to ‘some’ Cabinet
Ministers. It is highly probable, however, that it was Green as it is accomp anied by other arguments typical
of his reasoning (e.g. “It would be a tragic policy for Canada to stockpile nuclear weapons at this time...the
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Although Diefenbaker initially assumed nuclear weapons for the Canadian Forces were
necessary, near the end of his term in office he too believed, like Green and Robertson, that
these weapons were a dangerous solution.
The belief that both sides' weapons were dangerously offensive sometimes prompted
original arguments and new lines of reasoning. In Diefenbaker's case, he no longer refrained
from referring to the possibility of nuclear war but began to put forward vivid and grisly
references to its dangerous consequences. Due in part to his practiced rhetorical skills,
Diefenbaker excelled at using vivid metaphors (e.g. the Pentagon intended to make Canada a
“burnt sacrifice"; the Liberal party wanted to make Canada a "nuclear dump"65 ). The Prime
Minister's newfound convictions also impelled him to calculate the destructive capacity of
nuclear weapons. As he himself pointed out authoritatively in May 1962:
The present day bomb, with the dimension of 100 million tons of T.N.T., would
equal the explosive content of 10 million aircraft in the last war. That is why
those of us who have the responsibility of leadership—this responsibility that
remains with us day and night—carry this fear that through error or mistake we
bring about a war that will destroy all mankind.66

Indeed, Diefenbaker's assertion that he himself would be responsible through error or mistake
for bringing about a nuclear war is explicable only with reference to his new concept of joint
control. This original proposal was partly based on his conviction that Canada had to play a
more important role in harnessing the United States' possible resort to the use of these
devastating weapons.
The perception of NATO's own weapons as unnecessarily threatening also sometimes
influenced the way in which Critics filed and interpreted other related information. Once
Diefenbaker came to believe nuclear weapons were undesirable, he conveniently overlooked
the fact that he had previously favoured acquiring nuclear weapons. As Harkness commented

Canadian example might result in a dozen or more powers, some of them, like the United Arab Republic, in
tense and dangerous parts of the world, following the example...”).
65 Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), pp. 388, 392.
66 JGD Centre, Diefenbaker Speech Series Collection, vol. 87, file 1122, "International Affairs--Defence
Policy", May 28, 1962, p. 2.
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later, "he convinced himself by some process of self-hypnosis that he had never favoured
getting the nuclear weapons."67 The Prime Minister's capacity to reinterpret and rationalize the
past is best illustrated, however, by his claim during the 1963 election campaign that he had
always sought to acquire conventional warheads for the Bomarc missiles and his assertion that
"the Liberal party would have us put nuclear warheads on something that's hardly worth
scrapping". 68

Even Diefenbaker's definition of what he meant by 'the nuclear club' was

revised to reflect his new-found beliefs. In 1962 he interpreted Kennedy's disarmament plan,
announced at the UN, to mean that Canada would contribute to a dangerous expansion of the
nuclear club by acquiring nuclear warheads. However, Kennedy had announced there should
be no expansion of independent nuclear capabilities to other nations, and not referred to a
reduced need for NATO's nuclear weapons systems. Diefenbaker also interpreted the
Kennedy Declaration to mean that Canada would now definitely not need to join the nuclear
club. Yet the Canadian Joint Chiefs of Staff had previously, in their attempt to present a
rationale in support of nuclear weapons, pointed out that the only members of the so-called
nuclear club were the four nations which had developed an "independent" nuclear capability—
according to the Chiefs of Staff, Canada was seeking an "interdependent capability" to use the
nuclear warheads in conjunction with the US and the NATO allies.69 Thus, it seems
Diefenbaker's reluctance to acquire these weapons affected the way in which he interpreted
other related information, including President Kennedy's speeches and the advice he received
from the Canadian Joint Chiefs of Staff.

67 Nash, Kennedy & Diefenbaker, p. 296.
68 Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, p. 205. Although Diefenbaker claimed during the election that he had

always sought to acquire conventional warheads from the United States for the Bomarc A missiles, there is
no denying that the Cabinet, including Diefenbaker, knew in August 1961 that, "There were no
conventional warheads for the Bomarc B in production". PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, August 23, 1961, p. 8,
[SECRET].
69 DND, DHist, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff and Chief of Defence Staff, The Raymont Collection, Series 1,
73/1223, file 303, draft of a Joint Staff Working Paper, "Nuclear Weapons for Canadian Forces", October 11,
1961.
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The convictions of Critics about the danger of nuclear weapons also affected the way
in which they categorized incoming information. For instance, Green, Robertson, and
Diefenbaker did not make strong distinctions between strategic, tactical, defensive or offensive
nuclear weapons.70 If they categorized Canadian nuclear weapons systems at all, they grouped
them according to whether they were destined for deployment on Western European or
Canadian soil.71 Even during the Cuban missile crisis, when Diefenbaker and Green reluctantly
consented to begin negotiations to place future Canadian nuclear weapons systems in Europe
under NATO's command, these decision-makers steadfastly opposed deploying nuclear
warheads on Canadian soil. According to Knowlton Nash, their attitude 'puzzled' high-level
military representatives in Canada and the US because Canada seemed about to acquiesce to
an offensive nuclear strike role in Europe, yet reject a defensive nuclear role in Canada. It may
have been, as Nash argues, that Diefenbaker and Green countenanced nuclear weapons in
Europe, which was far away, but were reluctant to accept nuclear weapons in Canada's own
backyard.72 It is more likely, however, that the long delay before Diefenbaker and Green
agreed to pursue negotiations, as well as Diefenbaker's subsequent obfuscation and refusal to
sign the papers authorizing their acquisition73, meant that these Critics eventually agreed on

70 To illustrate, Howard Green pointed out in 1961 in Cabinet that, “In some countries, weapons of limited

range might be used for offensive purposes. Such a spread of nuclear weapons would increase the dangers
of war.” PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, August 23, 1961, p. 6, item c), [SECRET]. A few years later, when
Peyton Lyon interviewed Green in 1965, Green made no distinction between the nuclear weapons based in
Canada, with a radius of less than five hundred miles, and the strike aircraft in Europe, which could deliver
nuclear bombs well behind enemy lines. Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, p. 118, footnote 114. Years later,
however, Green did distinguish between first-strike and second-strike weapons. He argued that Canada
should not have become involved in the strike reconnaissance role in Europe, although in late 1962 he had
reluctantly agreed to it. The problem was, he explained later, due to "confusion" and "the defence people".
As he explained, "With the CF-104s, Canada got herself into the position where we were the strike force in
NATO. We should never have got into that position in the first place but the defence people got us into
that..." PAC, MG 32, B13, Howard Green Collection, vol. 12, transcript of interview of Howard Green by
Edwin Eades, October 21-22, 1980, pp. 79-81.
71 PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, August 23, 1961, pp. 4-5, [SECRET].
72 Nash, Kennedy & Diefenbaker, p. 212.
73 As Nash writes, after the Cuban missile crisis, Harkness tried several times to get Diefenbaker to sign the
papers authorizing the nuclear weapons for the Canadian NATO forces in Europe, but each time
Diefenbaker put him off, saying there was no hurry and that he wanted to sign the deals for all the nuclear
weapons systems at the same time. Ibid., p. 213.
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October 30th, 1962 to discussions with the US—but only as an unfortunate, yet necessary,
compromise to satisfy the allies and Defenders within Cabinet. Certainly the Cabinet records
show that on October 30th, Diefenbaker agreed to pursue secret negotiations with the US, led
by Green and Harkness, toward "a general agreement" based on the storage of missing parts
for the Bomarcs and the 101's in the US and premised on the storage of weapons for the
Canadian Forces in Europe on bases in Europe.74 However, there is no record afterwards that
Diefenbaker and Green actually agreed to acquire these nuclear warheads
In summary, therefore, the influential decision-makers at the centre of defence policymaking who abhorred the idea of acquiring any kind of nuclear weapons were Diefenbaker
(beginning in 1961), Green, Robertson and, further removed from the centre of decisionmaking, Ignatieff and General E.L.M. Burns, Canada's adviser to the UN's 18 Nation
Disarmament Committee. These decision-makers rejected both sides' nuclear arsenals as
unnecessarily threatening.

5. Critics believed deterrence doctrine was unsuitable and unreliable:
Another important characteristic of Critics was their lack of faith in deterrence and
tendency to denigrate the assumptions underpinning this doctrine. Critics generally believed that
to rely on the Alliance's nuclear forces would increase, not reduce, the likelihood of war.
Rather than depend on deterrence to prevent conflicts from occurring, they drew attention to
threatening scenarios which they feared could not be averted by deterrence.
In this case, as early as 1961, it was argued during Cabinet's secret discussions that it
would be misleading to give Canadians the impression that Bomarc missiles and Voodoos
could 'defend' them against nuclear weapons. According to the records of this meeting, an
unnamed Minister thought it would be deceptive of the government to let Canadians think the
Bomarc missiles and CF-101 interceptors were to protect them. 75
74 PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, October 30, 1962, pp. 10-11 [SECRET]
75 Ibid., August 23, 1961, p. 8, [SECRET].
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Despite this Minister's warning that there could be no defence against the enemy's weapons,
the idea the Alliance would be able to defend itself in the event of war continued to be common
currency among many Cabinet Ministers. The problem which developed for Prime Minister
Diefenbaker was that, although he initially subscribed to the view that making preparations for
civil defence against nuclear attack was necessary, by 1959-1960 he believed there would be
‘total destruction’ and ‘a shattered world’ if nations drifted into nuclear war. Due to such
dissonant beliefs about the foreseeable outcome of nuclear war, it probably was easier for
Diefenbaker to eventually convert to the view that there could be no defence against nuclear
weapons and no winner in a nuclear war. Whereas by 1961 he considered there could be "no
margin for doubt about the devastation which could be wreaked on mankind either by intent or
by miscalculation," by 1963 he had no hesitation about making stronger references to nuclear
war. As he stated, "The day the strike takes place, eighteen million people in North America
will die in the first two hours, four million of them in Canada"76
Prime Minister Diefenbaker's lack of faith in deterrence began to be evident in 1960.
His fear that Canada could not survive a thermonuclear war fuelled his growing lack of
confidence in the capacity of nuclear deterrence to avert nuclear war. It is noteworthy that by
1960 other defence policy-makers, like Arnold Heeney, were carefully expressing their doubts
about the credibility of the doctrine of 'massive retaliation'.77 The Prime Minister did not verse
his growing doubts about deterrence doctrine in strategic orthodoxy, however, but responded
with his own ideas about joint control. His explanation that, "We took the stand that we would
have them available if war ever came—that Canada would then be in a position to have
76 JGD Centre, Speech Series Collection, vol. 65, file 996, "Partial notes for an address at the Canadian Bar

Association Dinner", Winnipeg, September 1, 1961, p. 11; Nash, Kennedy & Diefenbaker, p. 228.
77 As Arnold Heeney wrote Howard Green in 1960: "This policy of 'nuclear deterrent' and 'massive
retaliation', although much maligned in some quarters has, ironically, recently received the highest tribute,
that of Soviet emulation. [In January 1960] Premier Khrushchev announced a similar policy for the Soviet
Union, based on the striking power of the Soviet ICBM, at the same time declaring the Soviet intention to
reduce military forces in the next two years to below levels planned for the United States forces."
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (formerly DEA), file 4901-Y-40, vol. 58, Ambassador
Arnold Heeney to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, "The Defence Debate: The Relative Strengths
of the United States and the Soviet Union", Washington, March 14, 1960, p. 2, [CONFIDENTIAL].
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available to her the best weapons possible" demonstrated a lack of faith in nuclear deterrence,
which was based then upon ready-to-shoot missiles and interceptors already-in-place.78
Diefenbaker's insistence on the 'missing parts' approach also defied conventional
strategic logic. His primary objective seemed to be to delay, and not deploy, nuclear
warheads. But Defenders argued that this approach meant that the missing warheads would
have to be flown to Canada during a crisis. They maintained that putting parts for nuclear
warheads in place during an emergency, or once a war had begun, undermined the survivability
of the United States' second-strike capability and belied a lesson of the Cuban missile crisis,
which was that a crisis could come to pass in a matter of hours and there would not be time to
install missing parts. Yet Diefenbaker reasoned differently. He seemed to assume Canada's
espousal of the missing parts approach would contribute to decreasing, not exacerbating,
tensions and slow-down, if not prevent, hair-trigger readiness during a crisis. By 1963, when
Diefenbaker hinted during his Nassau speech that the "white rocketry" would be scrapped
because no one had guessed four years before that the Soviet Union would develop
intercontinental missiles, the Prime Minister seemed to understand that both sides' vulnerability
meant that what was now important was that the Alliance strengthen its conventional forces.
This was imperative in order to avoid, as he put it, "the disastrous choice between surrender
and all-out nuclear war."79

Thus Diefenbaker's unorthodox suggestions about pursuing

joint control, ensuring missing parts, and strengthening the Alliance's stockpile of conventional
weapons, seem to have been advanced in order to slow-down escalatory tendencies, raise the
nuclear threshold, and curtail the US from overhastily resorting to the use of nuclear weapons.
The Prime Minister's search for alternatives, in other words, was premised on a serious
concern that nuclear deterrence alone was inadequate as a war prevention strategy.

78 JGD Centre, Diefenbaker Speech Series Collection, vol. 87, file 1122, "Untitled draft of speech", May 28,

1962, p. 1.
7979 Hansard, January 20, 1963; Diefenbaker One Canada 1962-1967, Vol. 3, “Transcript of Prime Minister’s
Statement”, p. 92
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Howard Green's reluctance to rely solely upon nuclear deterrence to prevent war also
led him to put forward an entirely different conception of the scenario which would foreseeably
arise out of Canada's decision to fulfill its nuclear commitments. As he explained to Cabinet in
1961, if Ministers chose to stockpile nuclear weapons, Canada would provide a bad example
to other countries that they, too, had an equal right to provide for their defence. This could
result in a dozen or more powers, like the United Arab Republic, following Canada's example
in tense and dangerous parts of the world.80 Apparently Green foresaw a frightening scenario
of dangers which might stem from rampant 'horizontal' proliferation and uncontrollable
escalation. Yet it was an unusual scenario for a Canadian decision-maker to advance at that
time. Most decision-makers who came to fear nuclear escalation, like Diefenbaker, envisioned
nuclear war solely in terms of the prospect of deterrence failing between the two superpowers.
Relatively few feared the consequences of horizontal nuclear proliferation. It seems the Minister
of External Affairs was willing to think independently about the logic of deterrence and draw
attention to alternative scenarios which were accorded little regard by strategists in NATO's
upper echelons.81 As Ignatieff recorded later, "if Green's naivety and lack of sophistication led
to some embarrassing incidents, these shrank in significance beside his selfless pursuit of world
peace and the determined, often imaginative way in which he explored solutions to international
conflicts."82

Conclusion:

80 PCO, Cabinet Conclusions, August 23, 1961, p. 6, Section c) [SECRET]. Notably, the Cabinet

Conclusions did not directly attribute this argument to Howard Green but to ‘some’ Cabinet Ministers. It is
very likely, however, that it was Green as it is accompanied by other arguments typical of his belief system
(e.g. “A nuclear war would be quite unlike any wars previously known; it would destroy civilization. There
were already enough nuclear weapons in the possession of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to destroy the
world and there was no need for more in Canada.”)
81 For example, see DEA, Statements and Speeches, no. 62/17, Howard Green, “NATO’s most harmonious
meeting”, House of Commons, December 17, 1962, p. 3.
82 Ignatieff, The Making of a Peacemonger, p. 197.
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It was asserted that high-level decision-makers like George Pearkes, Charles Foulkes,
Douglas Harkness, Arnold Heeney, Hugh Campbell, Frank Miller, and George Hees
possessed beliefs typical of Defenders—beliefs which led them during their terms in office to
advocate the acquisition of the nuclear weapons. Initially the Prime Minister was also
convinced that Canada should acquire these weapon systems, although he became more
uncertain beginning in 1959, after Howard Green was appointed Minister of External Affairs.
In the early years, however, the presence within the inner circle of decision-making of these
Defenders helped lead the government in a direction toward acquiring nuclear weapons. When
and why did the government change course?
At the centre and inner core of decision-making, Howard Green and Norman
Robertson had underlying belief systems typical of Critics—beliefs which led them between
1959 and 1963 to strongly oppose the acquisition of the nuclear weapons. Green and
Robertson, with the assistance of George Ignatieff, sought to delay the acquisition process and
to counsel the Prime Minister against acquiring the nuclear weapons. Although the growing
peace movement and the domestic public's increasingly anti-American stance also pushed the
Prime Minister to rethink the nuclear issue, there is no doubt that ‘the trio’ sought to delay, if
not reverse, the Prime Minister's stated policy in favour of obtaining nuclear weapons.
As for the Prime Minister himself, between 1960 and 1962 his views gradually
changed from those of a Defender to those of a Critic. This shift partly accounted for his initial
advocacy of nuclear weapons between June 1957 and August 1960, his vacillation and
indecisiveness until October 1962, and his rejection of the nuclear commitments in the period
between December 1962 and April 1963. Although the Prime Minister wanted to remain a
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member of NATO in good standing, he eventually questioned the necessity to acquire nuclear
weapons as part of Canada's commitment to the Alliance. Despite pressures from United
States' authorities, the media, and military personnel, Diefenbaker became more inclined to the
view of Critics—that Canada's acquisition of nuclear weapons would contribute to international
tensions and increase the likelihood of entrapment in a global holocaust. Although Diefenbaker
never questioned the necessity to deploy Canadian Forces overseas in Europe, he equivocated
in terms of the nuclear issue. His attitudes toward President Kennedy, the Cuban missile crisis,
Kennedy's memo, and the release of the U.S. State Department's press release, all contributed
to his growing fear of entrapment and reluctance to authorize the nuclear weapons acquisition.
Thus, although Diefenbaker's newfound belief system was not the only factor impelling the
government to oppose the nuclear weapons, it was significant. Allied with Green, Robertson,
and Ignatieff, the beliefs of Critics eventually overrode the convictions of Defenders.
In summary, it seems that many influential decision-makers in the inner circle possessed
interlocking belief structures typical of Defenders or Critics. These belief systems are
summarized in the following table (see overleaf):

38

Canadian Thinking about Nuclear Weapons & Defence Policy:
Core Assumptions & Beliefs

Defenders:
•

These decision-makers feared abandonment.

•

They believed Canada should pursue closer ties to the allies through established kinds of
military commitments.

•

They believed that the external threat to the Alliance was opportunistic and aggressive.

•

They assumed Canada and NATO’s weapons were necessary and non-threatening.

•

They believed that deterrence doctrine was suitable and reliable.

Critics:
•

These decision-makers feared entrapment.

•

They believed Canada’s established military ties to the allies should be restructured and
de-emphasized.

•

They believed the external threat was exaggerated and misunderstood.

•

They believed both sides’ weapons were unnecessarily threatening.

•

They believed deterrence doctrine was unsuitable and unreliable.

These belief systems shaped and constrained decision-making concerning whether or not to
fulfill Canada's Alliance commitments. Although there can be no doubt that a variety of other
systemic-level and domestic-level factors interacted to push the government towards acquiring
nuclear weapons—and eventually away from its previous commitments—it seems apparent
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that the beliefs of key decision-makers also played a significant role in affecting policy
outcomes.
Finally, it is interesting to consider that Canada was the only country during this timeperiod which rejected acquiring nuclear systems although it had the opportunity to possess
them.83 Despite the opportunity, capability, and even the knowledge base to acquire or
produce our own nuclear weapons, the strong convictions of a few politicians contributed to
the government's anti-nuclear stance. Although this stand was short-lived, and incoming Prime
Minister Pearson acted quickly to fulfill the government's commitments, a few years later the
Prime Minister who finally ordered the phasing-out of Canada's nuclear systems held many of
the same underlying beliefs and convictions as Green, Robertson, and Ignatieff.84 Whereas the
threesome were among the first influential Canadian decision-makers to criticize and oppose
acquiring nuclear weapons, the main elements of their beliefs resurfaced in later years with
respect to nuclear weapons as well as other NATO commitments, particularly the overseas
stationed land forces. Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s legacy was that he allowed this sort
of questioning and criticism to take place. Certainly, Diefenbaker vacillated, he was indecisive,
at times disingenuous. Perhaps he should have downplayed his own concerns about
entrapment in an American-led nuclear war or adopted a policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’?
However, Diefenbaker must be admired for having the temerity and frankness to at least
debate these issues, and go against the advice of his own defence experts. He is commendable
for being the first Prime Minister, and certainly not the last, to countenance Canada taking an
anti-nuclear stand.

83 At that time, three NATO nations (the US, the UK, and France) possessed their own nuclear weapons.

Five other NATO countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and Turkey) entered into bilateral
agreements with the US under which they would acquire nuclear weapons systems. As a 1968 DND study
for the Special Task Force on Europe added, these warheads were to be retained under US custody until
their release was authorized by 'joint decision'. DND, DHist, DND for STAFEUR, "Canadian Military
Interest in Europe", V 2390-1 (STAFEUR), November 1, 1968, p. 26, [SECRET].
84 See Simpson “Canada’s Contrasting NATO Commitments...”, ch. 4, pp. 184-245.
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